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--IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BRUCE C. JEPPSON
JEAN W. JEPPSOl-1,

and
his wife,

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 15318

UNITED TELEVISION,
KTVX T . V .

Il~C.

, aka

CHAi.\lNEL 4 ,
Defendant and
Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs for alleged
invasion of their right of privacy arising out of a telecast
wherein an announcer from the defendant station called
plaintiff Jean W. Jeppson on the program called "Dialing for
Dollars," and a telecast of the telephone conversation was
made.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss

plaintif~s'

complaint on the grounds that it did not state a claim ur·
, ..
which relief could be granted.

Written memoranda were fi;,

by the respective parties and after oral argument, and ab
taking the matter under advisement, the Honorable Dean E
Conder granted defendant's motion and dismissed plaintiff:
complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an affirmance of the judgment
below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The charging part of plaintiffs' complaint is se
forth in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 10.

For the convenience::

the Court, they are set forth herewith:
"3.
On or about March 2, 1977, at about
3: 00 0' clock P. M. of said day, Defendant, throu;
one of its agents telephoned the residence of
Plaintiffs.
Plaintiff, Jean W. Jeppson answere:
the phone and a man's voice was heard and asked·
this was Mrs. Jeppson, or the Jeppson residenc:.
and Mrs. Jean Jeppson responded that it was:
the man stated to the effect, 'this is Dialing··
Dollars, do you have your T. V. set on?', to whi:_
Jean Jeppson stated, 'no I don't.' Then theag:
for Defendant said, 'Oh, that is unfortunate .
considerable emphasis) because you could hav~,':'
$50. 00. ' Then Mrs. Jeppson said, 'well now ' ··

l:'
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tell you, I'd rather have peace in my home than
all that garbage on television, even for $50.00.'
Then the man laughed to some extent. Mrs. Jeppson
then said, 'Thank you for calling.' Then she hung
up the phone.
"Within about one minute from the time
Plaintiff hung up the phone the phone began to
ring and continued to do so with calls for the
rest of the afternoon for several hours from
people throughout the state of Utah, all of which
calls referred to the conversation that had taken
place between Plaintiff, Jean W. Jeppson and the
agent for Defendant. That said callers to Plaintiff
were rude and abusive, obscene, threatening and
harassing to Plaintiffs.
"4. That more than a dozen abusive and
harassing calls came to Plaintif!s in their home
as a direct result of the conversation that had
taken place between Mrs. Jeppson and the
agent for the Defendant. In addition there
have been numerous comments by friends and others
that discovered, or learned, or heard of the
conversation that has been embarassing and
humiliating and caused Plaintiffs considerable
outrage, mental suffering, shame and is an attack
on their reputation and character. That in
addition many of the crank calls that came to
Plaintiffs on this matter have caused considerable unrest and fear, shock, and fright to
Plaintiffs for their safety and well-being.
"5. That Defendant through it's agent
gave out over the air and over television the
telephone number and name of Plaintiffs and
furthermore carried out the conversation with
Plaintiff, Jean W. Jeppson, over the air and on
television without first informing Plaintiff that
the same was going over television and throughout
the state of Utah on the air."
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"10.
That Defendant in making its
telephone call on television and over the air'·
its program, Dialing for Dollars, with Plaintif:
was doing so for purposes of advertising or ~;
of trade in their [sic] broadcasting business.''
Plaintiffs brought their action in three counts
(R.

2-6)

The first cause of action was based upon a commc

law theory of invasion of right of privacy.

(R. 2-3)

Tb

second cause of action was based upon the Utah statutes
dealing with the same subject.

(R.

4)

The third cause of

action appears to be nothing but a separate claim for pun'.:
damages arising out of the same acts as set forth in the
first and second causes of action.

(R.

4-5)

Defendant attacked plaintiffs' complaint by a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.

(R. 9-10)

Both parties subrnitte:

written memoranda in support of their respective positions
(R. 12-29)

After oral argument to the court, the motion

taken under advisement, and subsequently granted.

(R.30-J:

Plaintiffs did not seek leave to amend, but stood upon the
allegations of their complaint.

This appeal followed.

(R. 33)
ARGUMENT
Although plaintiffs have made separate arguments
under the theories of invasion of common law dn d

- 4 -
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starurn<

right of privacy, we believe that the two points can best
be considered together.
An evaluation of the merits of plaintiffs' claim
requires a review of the historical development of the tort
known as invasion of the right of privacy.

The initial

history is well traced in Prosser on Torts, 4th Ed., commencing at page 802.

The author there said:

. Prior to the year 1890, no English or
American court ever had granted relief expressly
based upon the invasion of such a right, although
there were cases which in retrospect seem to have
been groping in that direction, and Judge Cooley
had coined the phrase, 'the right to be let alone.'
In 1890 there appeared in the Harvard Law Review a
famous article, by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis, which reviewed a number of cases in
which relief had been afforded on the basis of
defamation, invasion of some property right, or
breach of confidence or an implied contract, and
concluded that they were in reality based upon a
broader principle which was entitled to separate
recognition. In support of their argument they
contended that the growing excesses of the press
made a remedy upon such a distinct ground essential to the protection of private individuals
against the unjustifiable infliction of mental
pain and distress.
"
and on the next page the author continues:
"The first state really to come to grips with
the doctrine thus advanced was New York. After
cases in its lower courts had accepted the existence
of the right of privacy proposed by Warren and
Brandeis, it fell into the hostile hands of the
Court of Appeals in Robertson v. Rochester FoldingBox Company, where the defendant made use of the

- 5 -
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picture of a pulchritudinous young lady to ad•ier·
its flour without her consent.
In a four-to<i:,
decision, with a vigorous dissent, the court
flatly denied the existence of any right to pre:,
against such conduct, because of the lack of
precedent, the purely mental character of the
injury, the 'vast amount of litigation' which
might be expected to follow, the difficulty of
drawing a distinction between public and private
characters, and the fear of undue restriction o:
liberty of speech and freedom of the press .
. In consequence the next ::fow York legislature enacted a statute making it both a misdemeanor and a tort to make use of the name,
portrait or picture of any person for 'advertis·
ing purposes or for the purposes of trade' with·
out his written consent.
This act remains (he
law of New York, where there have been upwards
of a hundred decisions dealing with it. Except
as the statute itself limits the extent of the
right, the New York decisions are quite cons is·
tent with the common law as it has been worked
out in other states, and they are customarily
cited in privacy cases throughout the country.
II
One of the first states to follow Hew York, was
Utah which enacted a statute similar to the Jew York Act
Sec. 76-4-8 and Sec. 76-4-9, U.C.A., 1953.

Those statLJtes

provided as follows:
Sec. 76-4-8.
"Any person who uses for adv':
tising purposes or for purposes of trade, or u?'.:
any postal card, the name, portrait or picture·
any person, if such person is living, without ..
5
first having obtained the written consent of "'
person, or if a minor, of his parent or gu~rd~a:.
or if such person is dead, without the wric;er._
'
nveo
consent of his heirs or personal representa
is guilty of a misdemeanor."
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Sec. 76-4-9: "Any living person, or the heirs
or personal representatives of any deceased person, whose name, portrait or picture is used
within this state for advertising purposes or for
purposes of trade, without the written consent
first obtained as provided in the next preceding
section may maintain an action against such person
so using his name, picture or portrait to prevent
and restrain the use thereof; and may in the same
action recover damages for any injuries sustained
by reason of such use, and, if the defendant shall
have knowingly used such person's name, portrait
or picture in such manner as is declared to be
unlawful, the jury or court, if tried without a
jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary
damages."
This Court construed the above-quoted statutes in
Donahue vs. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 2
Ut.2d 256, 272 P.2.d 177.

That case involved a movie which

contained a fictionalized account of the life of plaintiffs'
decedent.

Plaintiffs sued defendant on the theory that the

moving picture was a commercial venture and that, therefore,
the use of decedent's life history without consent of his
heirs was a violation of the statute.

The conflicting

theories upon which the case was submitted to this court
were set forth in the opinion as follows:
"It is the plaintiff's theory that the
use of a person's name or picture in any manner
in which the profit motive is present comes within
the meaning of the phrase 'for purposes of trade'
as used in our statute and is proscribed by it;
whereas defendant contends to the contrary that
such a broad application of the statute, which

- 7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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would interdict the publication of person's
name or the portrayal of his character in news
reports or any media of information which was
operated for profit, such as newspapers, radio
and television broadcasts, magazine articles,
biographical sketches, historical accounts,
novels, plays, etc., would so offend against
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press that the statute if
so interpreted would be unconstitutional. Defendants therefore argue that the statute was
only intended to apply to actual advertising
or the promotion of sales of a collateral commodity, which interpretation would obviate the
difficulties as to its constitutionality. We
are confronted with the question as to which of
these contentions is correct.
This court then reviewed the history of actions '.
invasions of right of privacy essentially as set
our quotation from Prosser.

forth~

The court then quoted from the

case of Rhodes vs. Sperry & Hutchinson & Co., 193 H.Y. 223,
85 N.E. 1097, as follows:
"
. Such is the character of the right of
privacy preserved by legislation protecting
persons against the unauthorized use of their
names or portraits in the form of advertisement or trade notices.
It is a recognition by
the lawmaking power of the very general sentiment which prevailed throughout the colllll1unitY
against permitting advertisers to promote th§.
sale of their wares by this method, regardless"
of the wishes of the persons thereby affected.
(Emphasis added.)
That case, construing the

i~ew York statute, had

been decided prior to the time that Utah adopted the Jew

- 8 -
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York act and therefore, assumedly adopted the act with the
construction placed upon it by the New York court.

This

court finally concluded as follows:
"This leaves us two alternatives: First
to give it a strict and literal application, to
prohibit the use of a name, portrait or picture
in any manner whatsoever, whether factual or
fictional, in connection with any publication
where a profit motive is present; or Second,
the interpretation contended for by defendants,
that the statute was intended only to prohibit
the use of names, portraits or pictures in
connection with advertising or the promotion
of the sale of collateral items."
In holding for the contention advanced by the
defendant, this court said:
.On the other hand, social considerations,
the legislative history of our statute, and its
context considered in the light of rules of
statutory construction, all point persuasively
to the conclusion that the interpretation contended for by the defendant is that which comports with the legislative intent."
Since there is no allegation or claim that defendant's
telecast was intended to advertise or promote "the sale of
collateral items," it appears clear that under the law as it
existed up to 1973, plaintiffs would have had no right of
action under either the common law, or the statutes of this
state·

In that year, Sections 7 6-4-8 and 9 were repealed as

part of a general revamp of the Utah Penal Code.

They were

- 9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Althou~

replaced by Sections 76-9-402 to 406 inclusive.

plaintiffs have referred to Sections 76-4-8 and 9 in thei:
complaint, they apparently make no claim for them here,
since they are not cited in their brief, and were repealed
before the date of the telecast in question.

The issue,

therefore, is whether the newly enacted statutes 76-9-402,

405 and 406 change the law as it existed in 1973, and creat;
a cause of action which did not previously exist.
Section 76-9-402 provides, insofar as material
here, as follows:

"76-9-402. Privacy violation. --(1) A person is guilty of privacy violation if, except as
authorized by law, he:
(a) Trespasses on property with intent to
subject anyone to eavesdropping or other surveillance in a private place; or

(c)
Installs or uses outside of a private
place any device for hearing, recording, amplifying, or broadcasting sounds originating in the
place which would not ordinarily be audible or
comprehensible outside, without the consent_ of
the person or persons entitled to privacy tnere.
(2)
meanor."

Privacy violation is a class B misde-

A reading of this statute clearly indicates that
.
it has no application to the facts of this case,

- 10 -
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" allege•,

a~

in plaintiffs' complaint.

There is no claim here that the

defendant did anything more than call the plaintiff Jean
Jeppson on her telephone and broadcast the conversation
which took place.

Certainly defendant did not trespass on

plaintiffs' property.

Subpart (c) clearly refers to a hidden

microphone or other similar "bugging" device, and not to a
telephone with a publicly listed number.
Section 76-9-403 is entitled "Communication abuse"
and has to do with the interception of telephone and
telegraph messages, letters, or other means of private
communication or divulging the content of such communications.

It clearly has no application here.
Section 76-9-405 provides as follows:
"Abuse of personal identity.--(1) A person
is guilty of abuse of personal identity if, for
the purpose of advertising any articles of
merchandise for purposes of trade or for any
other advertising purposes, he uses the name,
picture, or portrait of any individual or uses the
name or picture of any public institution of this
state, the official title of any public officer of
this state, or of any person who is living,
without first having obtained the written consent
of the person, or, if the person be a minor, the
written consent of his parent or guardian, or, if
the person is dead, without the written consent of
his heirs or personal representatives.
(2) Abuse of personal identity is a class B
misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This is the Section which most closely resembles former
Section 76-4-8.

By its terms it is clearly limited to

abuse of personal identity "for the purpose of advertisino·c
any articles of merchandise for purposes of trade or for
any other advertising purposes.

The language of th2

statute appears to embody fully the holding of this court
in Donahue, that is, that to be actionable under the statuc,
the broadcast must advertise or promote the sale of "collateral items."

There is no allegation or even suggestion::

plaintiffs' complaint that any merchandise was being adver'..
in connection with the broadcast of which plaintiffs comp:,
Section 76-9-406 merely provides a remedy for
offenses committed under the previously discussed statutes
The second cause of action fails to state a claim for an
invasion of the plaintiffs' right of privacy under the Uta'
statutes.
We turn then to the question of whether plaintC
have stated a claim apart from statute for a common law
known as invasion of the right of privacy.

to:

As noted earL'

in this brief, there was no common law right of action fo;
invasion of the right of privacy prior to 1900. The righc

· iew
N
y or k
was first recognized by statute in
..

Utari and
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Vi:ginia followed with their own statutory enactments.

In

the period of the thirties, several states recognized a
right of action for invasion of the right of privacy.

Utah,

so far as our research reveals, has never recognized the
existence of such a right, other than as provided by statute.
As

pointed out by Prosser, there have been more than one

hundred case decisions in -.:l'ew York interpreting its statute.
Those cases have been accepted by other states as consistent
with what the common law should be in the absence of statute.
In short, there is no right of action for invasion of the
right of privacy broader than that provided by the state
statutes.
It must be further observed that it is not the
publication of any private matter which is actionable.

The

rule in this regard is well stated by Prosser at page 811,
as follows:
"The final limitation is that the matter
made public must be one which would be offensive
and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary
sensibilities. The law is not for the protection
of the hypersensitive, and all of us must, to
some reasonable extent, lead lives exposed to
the public gaze. Anyone who is not a hermit must
expect the more or less casual observation of
his neighbors and the passing public as to what
he is and does, and some reporting of his daily
activities.
(Emphasis added.)

- 13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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To the same effect is Harper and James on The Law of Torts
Section 9.5, pages 677 and 678:

"

.It is not every invasion of a privacy
interest that is actionable, of course. The
mere fact of living in a social order implies
certain annoying contacts with others which
even the least fastidious member of the
community may on occasion resent.
Nevertheless, such experiences are the price of social
intercourse.
It is only when these annoyances
become unreasonable by offending against prevailing standards of decency that the law takes
cognizance of them.
(Emphasis added.)
and at page 691, Section 9.7:
11

.All will admit that some intrusions into
one's personal life are so indecent and outrageous and calculated to cause such excruciat~g
mental pain to all but the most callous that it
would be a reproach to the law not to allow
redress.
On the other hand, it is equally clear
that society cannot protect the neurotically
thin-skinned against those trivial invasions
of privacy which the normal person suffers with
equanimity.
The mores and the law must dis tin·
guish the one from the other."
(Emphasis added)
Also to the same effect is Restatement of Torts, Section Ji
Comment d:
11

• • On
the other hand, liability exists onb.Y
if the defendant's conduct was such that he
should have realized that it would be offens~
to persons of ordinary sensibilities. It is
only where the intrusion has gone beyond the
limits of decency that liability accrues· · ·
(Emphasis added.)

Tentative Draft No. 13 of the Restatement of To::
Sec. 652B provides as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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"One who intentionally intrudes, physically
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another, or his private affairs or concerns, is
subject to liability to the other for invasion
of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable man." (Emphasis added.)
As illustrative of a case supportive of this view, see Williams

v. KCMO Broadcasting Division--Meredith Corporation, (Mo.App.),
472 S.W.2d l.

There was nothing indecent, vulgar, obscene, scandalous, threatening, terrifying, or even of questionable taste
in the telephone contact which plaintiffs allege defendant
~ade

with plaintiff Jean Jeppson, as set forth in paragraph

3 of the complaint.

The call was, at worst, a mild annoyance

of the kind commonly experienced daily by nearly everyone
having a telephone.

Telephone surveys, telephone sales

solicitations, telephone solicitations for charitable
contributions, and even wrong numbers are annoying and
irritating, but are of the type that the possessors of
telephones must expect to experience.
The real gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint appears
to be not the momentary interruption in plaintiff's day by
the telephone call initiated by defendant, but by a series
of telephone calls which plaintiff allegedly received thereafter

This defendant, of course, cannot be responsible for

- 15 -
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the reactions of others to a telephone call which was 1·n··
nu~:
initiated in the reasonable expectation that plaintiff wo;
be pleased to be the potential lucky recipient of a fifty·
dollar prize.

Whatever animosity and adverse criticism

plaintiffs received were apparently as the result of 11rs.
Jeppson' s own acid comments to the broadcaster, and not
anything stated by the defendant's announcer.
Plaintiffs place great reliance on the provision;
of FCC Regulation 73.1206.
in plaintiffs' complaint.

This regulation was not ple~
Assuming, however, that the m:

may take judicial notice of it, we submit that this is a
regulation designed to direct and control the conduct of
radio business--not to create private rights of action fw
individuals.

The apparent purpose of the regulation is to

prevent the inadvertent publication of objectionable m~~~
over the airways by a person not being aware that he is on
the air.

The right of action for invasion of right of

privacy depends upon local statutory and common law--not
federal regulations.
Plaintiffs also rely strongly in the case of
Froelich v. Adair,

(Kan.), 516 P. 2d 993.

That case is

different on its facts, and therefore, of little persuas>

- 16 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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v~lue.

we

~ave

However, the court there
advocated here.

recog~ized

the rule which

In its syllabus No. 2 the court said:

"2. One who intentionially intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another, or his private affairs
or concerns, is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable man." (Emphasis added.)
See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Fromme,
who said:

.The admitted facts of this case giving
rise to the claim of intrusion of seclusion
bring the case within the recognized limitation
that no action exists unless the wrongful
intrusion is such as to outrage or cause mental
suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person
of ordinary sensibilities. In Y2 of the syllabus
the court holds:
"'One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude
or seclusion of another, or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable man.'
[Emphasis
added.]
"The last phrase of this syllabus delimits
such an action. Intrusion of seclusion to be
actionable must be highly offensive to a reasonable man. The common link uniting all of the
cases which recognize the cause of action is
the unwarranted, obtrusive and objectionable
intrusion into the privacy of another. In this
case the appellant admits (appellant's brief
page 10) it is not the embarrassment potential
of the information obtained, it is the intrusion
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itself which the court should analyze to see
if one's seclusion has been intruded upon.
The character of the intrusion should determi~
liabilitity or non-liability. The degree of
the mental anguish does not determine liability,
only the amount of damages.
"No court has said that every invasion
of itself into another person's private quarters
constitutes an actionable invasion of privacy.
It is only when the invasion is so outrageous
that the traditional remedies of trespass,
nuisance, intentional infliction of mental
distress, etc., will not adequately compensate
a plaintiff for the insult to his individual
dignity that an invasion of privacy action
will lie. The intrusion itself must be patently
offensive before an invasion of privacy action
will lie. The totality of the intruder's
conduct must be extreme, intentional and outrageous; the conduct must be so offensive
that it would cause mental harm or anguish
in a person of ordinary sensibilities. An
invasion of privacy action should not be utilized to avoid the more stringent requirements
of other torts designated to compensate an
individual for physical or mental injury."
In support of their third count plaintiffs rely c
the article on Fright, Shock, Etc. in 38 Am.Jur.2d, PP· l-"
This treatise demonstrates the lack of merit to plaintiffs
claim.

Thus at pages 3-5, ~l, the rule is announced as

follows:
"Although some forms of mental or
emotional disturbances are recognized as
real harm or damage, the well-established
general rule is that liability may not be
predicated upon the negligence of an actor
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where the resulting damage is merely a mental
or emotional disturbance. This general rule
is applied where the mental or emotional
disturbance is not accompanied by a bodily
impact, and is not attended or followed by
an injury to the person or body of the plaintiff,
and where there is no other legal injury or
cause of action, or other element of recoverable
damages upon which a cause of action might be
predicated. In such cases, the rule of
damnum absque injuria has been said to prevail."
And at pages 6-8,

~4

it is stated:

"The almost universal view is that an actor
is liable for a severe mental disturbance which
he causes intentionally, or where the wrongful
act or omission is wilful, wanton, or malicious,
as distinguished from a wrongful act constituting
negligence merely. Additional indirect authority
in support of the view that there is liability
for an intentional wrong which causes mental
disturbance is to be found in the cases which
state that there can be no recovery for a
mental or emotional disturbance in the absence
of any element of wilfulness, wantonness, malice,
insult, abuse, or inhumanity.
"Some authorities, in defining the intentional tort, impose certain limitations or
prescribe certain elements, such as that the
actor must be guilty of 'extreme and outrageous
conduct,' and that the conduct must cause 'severe
emotional distress'." (Emphasis added.)
Clearly defendant's motives were innocent.

Far

from desiring to cause plaintiffs any mental harm, defendant
was only offering to them an opportunity for financial reward
in a game which most persons would regard as fun.
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COHCLUSION
The allegations of plaintiffs' complaint wholly
fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted und::i'
the law of this state.

It follows,

therefore, that the juc

ment of the court below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN &

1

Ray R. Christensen
Attorneys for Defendant and R<,
i

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Respondent's Brie: 1
to:

Gaylen S. Young, Jr. , attorney for Plaintiff and AppeL

2188 Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah
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-i

II

day of October, 1977.

Secretary
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